A Tale of Two Kenneths: A Brief History of Campus Antisemitism in U.S. Civil Rights Law, 2004–present

Or: Why the Executive Order on Antisemitism Does Matter

Written in collaboration with Isaac Brooks Fishman and cross-posted to Jewschool

Earlier this month, President Trump issued an executive order on antisemitism, which created more confusion than policy. It is not clear from the face of the order what it is doing, or why it was so controversial.  By looking at the history of the two men whose work led to the order—Kenneth L. Marcus, the current Assistant Education Secretary for Civil Rights, and Kenneth S. Stern, the lead author of the “working definition of antisemitism”—its design and intended effects become clear. Namely, the order is the result of a fifteen-year campaign to suppress pro-Palestinian college student activism.

In order to understand the chilling effect this  executive order will likely have on campus discourse, it is helpful to review the history of the application of U.S. Civil Rights law to antisemitism, with a focus on two things:

  1. The application of Title VI of the U.S. Civil Rights Act to claims of antisemitism on campus
  2. The definition of antisemitism used in these cases

Both of these points have undergone a substantial policy shift in the last fifteen years.

Obviously, there isn’t space here to give a full accounting of antisemitism as defined in American civil rights law, or how it has been enforced on campuses. But we hope to paint, at least in broad strokes, a picture of developments in the last decade and a half. Many of these developments can be described by examining the work of the two Kenneths.


Before we dive into the history, we need to define some basic terminology. 

Title VI of the U.S. Civil Rights Act of 1964 prohibits discrimination “on the ground of race, color, or national origin” in “any program or activity receiving Federal financial assistance.”1 Note that religion is not a protected class under Title VI, though there are other federal laws that prohibit religious discrimination.2

Colleges and universities are strongly dependent on federal financial assistance as part of financial aid programs, and the Title VI protections are the strongest way for the federal government to regulate discrimination on college campuses. A college that does not adequately address discrimination could be stripped of federal funding. In accordance with Title VI, the Department of Education’s Office for Civil Rights (OCR) is involved in investigating discrimination on campuses.

The Office for Civil Rights (OCR) is part of the U.S. Department of Education.

Kenneth L. Marcus

From 2003 to 2004, Marcus headed the Department of Education’s Office for Civil Rights (OCR).3 It was there he began a project to change the way OCR addresses complaints of antisemitism on college campuses.

Kenneth L. Marcus

Marcus believed that Title VI should be used to combat antisemitism on campus. But in OCR, he found that complaints of antisemitism were frequently dismissed out of hand because Jews were seen as a religion, not a race or national origin.4 To strengthen OCR’s ability to combat antisemitism, Marcus developed a policy expressed in a Dear Colleague letter5 he wrote in September 2004:

“While OCR lacks jurisdiction to prohibit discrimination against students based on religion per se, OCR will aggressively prosecute harassment of religious students who are targeted on the basis of race or gender, as well as racial or gender harassment of students who are targeted on the basis of religion.”6

Note that this letter did not define antisemitism, but it did say that Title VI should be used to protect members of religious groups from discrimination due to actual or perceived national origin. Examples given include not only Jews but other religious groups that often share ethnic characteristics, such as Sikhs and Arab Muslims.

Marcus left his post sometime near the end of 2004. He claims that his successors at OCR did not enforce his more expansive interpretation of Title VI, a claim that they dispute (as we will cover later.) 7

Kenneth S. Stern 

Around the same time, the other Kenneth, Kenneth S. Stern, was a leading member of the committee that drafted the original version of the definition of antisemitism in Trump’s recent executive order. In Stern’s capacity as the American Jewish Committee’s resident expert on antisemitism, he helped write the definition as a project of the European Monitoring Center on Racism and Xenophobia.8 It was adopted as a “working definition” of antisemitism in 2005 and was originally meant to be used in Europe for purposes of data collection.

Kenneth S. Stern

Given the definition’s history,9 it is now variously referred to as the U.S. State Department definition, the International Holocaust Remembrance Association (IHRA) definition, the European Union Monitoring Center (EUMC) definition, and the European Monitoring Center on Racism and Xenophobia definition. Despite some differences,10 they are largely equivalent. (Given the confusion this can cause, in this article, we will refer to it as the “Working Definition” or simply “the definition.”)

Stern did not intend for the definition to be used on American college campuses, and certainly not on Title VI claims under the U.S. Civil Rights Act, but within a few years it was being used in this context. 

Marcus leads the U.S. Commission on Civil Rights (USCCR)

In late 2004, after leaving OCR, Marcus became Staff Director at the U.S. Commission on Civil Rights (USCCR),11 an independent, bipartisan federal civil rights commission.12 He began using his position to apply outside pressure on OCR to comply with his 2004 policy — or rather, his interpretation of it. (As described below, OCR claims that their policies had not changed and that Marcus’s 2004 policy was being enforced.)

To this end, USCCR held a briefing on campus antisemitism in November 2005, publishing a report based on said briefing in July 2006.13 

The report contained statements from a number of Jewish and pro-Israel organizations, including the American Jewish Committee, the Anti-Defamation League, the Israel on Campus Coalition, as well as leaders from the Zionist Organization of America (ZOA), the American Jewish Congress, and the Institute for Jewish and Community Research.14

Alongside accounts of clearly antisemitic activity, the report includes incidents that have a much more dubious claim to antisemitism, such as anti-Zionist sentiments or even criticism of Israel that the report claims “demonizes” the country or “holds it up to disproportionate scrutiny.”15 The report notably appears to have no responses from or accounts of the people whose activities are characterized as antisemitic.

The cover of the 2006 USCCR report on campus antisemitism.

The report contained a list of recommendations, including the following (Note: the USCCR has no enforcement power over OCR so these were non-binding):

  • OCR “should protect college students from anti-Semitic and other discriminatory harassment by vigorously enforcing Title VI.” (This seems to imply that OCR was not currently doing this.)
  • Academic departments, and specifically Middle East studies departments, “respect intellectual diversity”
  • Federal grant-making institutions ensure that U.S. government funds are not used to “support discriminatory conduct.”16
  • “OCR should conduct a public education campaign to inform college students of the rights and protections afforded to them under federal civil rights laws, including the right of Jewish students to be free from anti-Semitic harassment”17 
  • The Office of Postsecondary Education (OPE) should collect and report data on “broader range of anti-Semitic and other hate crimes” on college campuses.
  • “Congress should amend Title VI to make clear that discrimination on the basis of Jewish heritage constitutes prohibited national origin discrimination.” (This would later be attempted in the form of the Anti-Semitism Awareness Act, see below.)


In later writings, Marcus and American Jewish leaders would use the USCCR report as evidence that the OCR was not fulfilling its obligations under Title VI. 

Additionally, while at the USCCR, Marcus put pressure on his successor at OCR, Stephanie Monroe, to follow his 2004 Dear Colleague letter on Title VI.  Monroe claimed that there had been no policy change, and that the OCR still had jurisdiction over antisemitism claims that were related to race, color, or national origin, and noted that an antisemitism investigation that had been opened at UC Irvine was still ongoing. 18Marcus maintained that the OCR policy should be to exercise Title VI jurisdiction on antisemitism cases except those based “very specifically on religious faith,” which he said he had not seen, implying that all or nearly all antisemitism cases had a race or national origin component.19 Marcus would later make this argument in detail in a journal article published the next year.

Obama-era clarification on Title VI

Marcus continued to advocate for his interpretation of Title VI to be implemented; namely, that Jewish students should be protected under U.S. Civil Rights Law on the basis of race or national origin. His advocacy efforts included writing articles in both scholarly20 and popular21 publications, as well as writing a book on the topic.22  

Notably, in a 2007 journal article,23 Marcus notes that his 2004 policy has been controversial.24 25 Marcus defends his policy by making a legal argument, one which he had not made in the 2004 Dear Colleague letter: that Jews should be categorized as a race on the basis of a 1987 Supreme Court case that recognized Jews as a race under Civil Rights Act of 1866.26 (Previously in the United States, the term “race” was used in a similar way as the term “ethnicity” is used today.) According to Marcus, because the intent of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 was to extend the Civil Rights Act of 1866, the Court ruled that Jews should be entitled to protection under racial discrimination laws. Thus, Marcus claims, Jews should also be protected from racial discrimination under Title VI.27

In March 2010, a group of American Jewish organizations28wrote to then-Secretary of Education Arne Duncan regarding OCR’s approach to antisemitism cases under Title VI. 29 The authors quote the 2006 USCCR report30 described above, as well as explain the logic behind the 2004 Marcus policy using the same Supreme Court case cited in Marcus’s journal article.  

In this letter, again, antisemitism is not explicitly defined, but here we see references to anti-Zionist or anti-Israel activity as being possible manifestations of antisemitism. 

Their advocacy worked.

In October 2010, about seven months later, the OCR issued a new Dear Colleague letter containing a clarification of their Title VI policy. 31 Written by Assistant Secretary Russlyn Ali, the policy restated the essence of Marcus’s 2004 Dear Colleague letter.

Russlyn Ali, Assistant Secretary for Civil Rights under President Obama

And according to Marcus, the new policy (the “Ali policy”) actually went even further. He gives four reasons for this:

  • The antisemitic activity “does not have to include intent to harm.”
  • It need not be “directed at a specific target.”
  • “[R]epeated incidents” are not needed to create a hostile environment. 
  • Individual punishment is not sufficient; the educational institution must “take prompt and effective steps reasonably calculated to end the harassment and prevent its recurrence.”32

Despite his praise, Marcus was concerned that without an established definition of antisemitism, enforcement would be ineffective. To that end, he advocated for using the Working Definition in Title VI cases as a next step for improvement.33 

This point should be underscored: this OCR policy did not mention the Working Definition of antisemitism (or any definition of antisemitism) at all.34 

Many people who supported the Title VI policy clarification did not necessarily support a proposed adoption of the Working Definition in combination with it. Stern himself notes that during his work at AJC, he was able to help a group of high school students claim Title VI protections under this new policy clarification, in a case that did not involve Israel.35 

Applying the definition in combination with Title VI

At this point, Stern claims that some pro-Israel groups began using this Title VI policy clarification in combination with the Working Definition of antisemitism. As Stern explained: 

 “[S]ome Jewish groups and individuals, especially after they were armed with this new Title VI clarification, began filing complaints based, in part, on assertions that a hostile environment was created on particular college campuses because of anti-Israel expressions they believed transgressed the Department of State Definition of Antisemitism.”36

In 2011, Marcus founded37 the Louis D. Brandeis Center for Human Rights Under Law (no affiliation with Brandeis University), primarily devoted to fighting campus antisemitism and advocating for Title VI application to antisemitism cases.38 The Brandeis Center soon became a leader in filing Title VI antisemitism complaints.39

Around the same time, as a new wave of Title VI complaints were filed in 2011, Stern co-wrote40 a letter, voicing concern in response to the definition’s use in Title VI cases, claiming that it was being used to suppress political speech. Stern and his co-author, Cary Nelson, note that the definition may be helpful for documenting antisemitic incidents on campus, but that it should not be used in Title VI complaints.41

Meanwhile, the Jewish press discussed the progress of these Title VI cases. A March 2012 Forward article noted that of the six cases related to anti-Israel activity, none had succeeded. And some mainstream Jewish and pro-Israel groups even came out publicly against using Title VI, at least to the extent advocated by Marcus.42 

In a 2013 op-ed, Marcus, while noting that the complaints were uniformly unsuccessful, promoted them as nonetheless effective because they led to bad publicity for the accused.43

These cases – even when rejected – expose administrators to bad publicity. Just last week, I heard from a university chancellor who is eager to work with the Schusterman Center for Israel studies at Brandeis University to avert the possibility of a civil rights complaint.

At many campuses, the prospect of litigation has made a difference.

If a university shows a failure to treat initial complaints seriously, it hurts them with donors, faculty, political leaders and prospective students. No university wants to be accused of creating an abusive environment.

…[W]e are creating a very strong disincentive for outrageous behavior by students in particular… Apparently students are being told not to get mixed up in Jewbaiting, rather to focus on their studies and get their degrees. Needless to say, getting caught up in a civil rights complaint is not a good way to build a resume or impress a future employer.

As time went on without success, pro-Israel advocates continued to advocate for formalizing the Working Definition as the OCR’s official definition of antisemitism, as well as for its adoptions in other venues. In 2015, a proposal for the University of California system to adopt the definition was put forward by the Brandeis Center and others.44  The UC-system proposal to adopt the definition failed, although one eventually passed that condemned “anti-Semitism, anti-Semitic forms of anti-Zionism and other forms of discrimination.”45

In the years following the Obama-era OCR policy clarification, none of the Title VI cases involving Israel gained traction.46 Given the lack of success, the next step — as in any activist cause — was to escalate.

Taking the fight to Congress: the Anti-Semitism Awareness Act (2016-2019)

The debate about applying the Working Definition to Title VI cases eventually reached Congress in 2016 with the introduction of the Anti-Semitism Awareness Act,a bill which would require use of the definition for the purposes of Title VI47 It passed in the Senate on the same day it was introduced. However, after First Amendment concerns were raised, it failed to pass in the House. The bill was reintroduced in both 2018 and 2019, but it never again passed in either chamber.48 49  (The ACLU released statements opposing the measure in its different versions, as did other groups, including civil rights and Arab, Muslim, and/or pro-Palestinian organizations.50 51

Stern strongly opposed the Anti-Semitism Awareness Act, writing a 2016 op-ed in the New York Times decrying the use of the definition outside its original context, and describing the bill as a “speech code.”52 Later, in November 2017, Stern testified before the House Judiciary Committee describing the types of abuses of the definition that he had already seen in Title VI cases.53

By contrast, many mainstream American Jewish institutions supported the Anti-Semitism Awareness Act, including the Anti-Defamation League (ADL), American Israel Public Affairs Committee (AIPAC), the Jewish Federations of North America, the American Jewish Committee, Jewish Council for Public Affairs, and others.54

Kenneth Marcus is confirmed as head of OCR (2018)

Kenneth L. Marcus speaks at his Senate confirmation hearing, Dec. 5, 2017.

Meanwhile, after the first failure of the Anti-Semitism Awareness Act to pass in both chambers of Congress, the Trump administration nominated Kenneth Marcus to be the Assistant Education Secretary for Civil Rights (head of the OCR) in late 2017.55

Marcus’s nomination was opposed by civil rights groups for several reasons, Israel-Palestine among them.56(While a full examination of reasons unrelated to Israel-Palestine is beyond the scope of this piece, concerns raised include his approach toward disparate impact claims and protections for LGBTQ, immigrant, and disabled students,57 as well as his opposition to race-based affirmative action in college admissions,58 his support of the Trump Department of Education’s rescinding of Title IX guidelines on campus sexual assault,59 and his proposal during his previous tenure at OCR to change Title IX regulations to allow sex-segregated educational programs that the ACLU describes as “inconsistent with the anti-discrimination principles enshrined in Title IX and the Equal Protection Clause.”60

A number of Jewish groups supported Marcus’s nomination, most notably the campus Jewish organization Hillel International.61 Others included B’nai B’rith International, the American Jewish Committee, the National Council of Young Israel,62 (as well as more ideologically right-wing groups such as the Zionist Organization of America and CAMERA). Meanwhile, the National Council of Jewish Women opposed the nomination on the basis of Marcus’s positions on Title IX.63 

Marcus was ultimately confirmed about seven months later, in June 2018, in a vote of 50-48.64

Pro-Israel Groups Return to the OCR

After Kenneth L. Marcus was confirmed as the Assistant Education Secretary for Civil Rights, pro-Israel groups knew they had a solid bureaucratic ally.  Even though the Anti-Semitism Awareness Act had never managed to pass in Congress, there was now a real chance that the OCR would, at least in practice, begin using the Working Definition in Title VI antisemitism cases. In other words, although the Working Definition of Antisemitism had not yet gained formal legal recognition as the official definition of antisemitism vis-à-vis Title VI claims, there was hope that some de facto application of the definition to Title VI cases could occur through targeted filing of complaints — especially given that a leading advocate of this very policy was now the head of the OCR.

And they had success within just a couple of months. The first use of the Working Definition by the Office for Civil Rights seems to be in August 2018, when the OCR re-opened a Title VI investigation at Rutgers University that had been closed by the Obama administration in 2014 due to insufficient evidence. As was widely reported, the OCR re-opened the case in response to an appeal from the Zionist Organization of America (ZOA), and Kenneth Marcus informed ZOA that the OCR would use the Working Definition in the new investigation.65 66 

ZOA leaders subsequently claimed67 that the application of the definition in the Rutgers case would apply to other Title VI antisemitism cases, though this appears to contradict a Department of Education statement reported by the libertarian-aligned Foundation for Individual Rights in Education (FIRE), which asserted that the DoE had not adopted a formal definition of antisemitism and that judgments would be made on a case-by-case basis.68

While it is unclear whether the news of the OCR’s use of the Working Definition caused an increase in the number of Title VI complaints filed (since pro-Israel groups have been attempting to use the definition for years in their complaints),69 it is informative to look at the types of investigations that the OCR has opened. According to a New York Times report, “Marcus has opened ‘national origin’ investigations of both the University of Pennsylvania and Stanford to determine whether qualified applicants were rejected because of their Judaism.”70 OCR has also opened an investigation of the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill and Duke University after an event co-sponsored by both universities included a Palestinian rapper allegedly using antisemitic lyrics.71 Additionally, Marcus’s OCR opened investigations against New York University and Williams College.72 73

Solidifying Gains for the Future: The Executive Order

But Marcus and others knew that any policy changes they had made needed to be safeguarded. Just as Marcus was disappointed by the way in which OCR implemented (or failed to implement) his 2004 Dear Colleague letter, a new administration’s appointees could reverse his changes. 

To clear up this ambiguity and shore up the Working Definition as the official definition of antisemitism for use in Title VI antisemitism cases on a standardized basis, the Trump administration authored this Executive Order.74Until recently, Title VI complainants have had to argue that the Working Definition should be relevant to their cases, and from the second half of 2018 until now, the OCR’s use of the Working Definition was a matter of informal policy (supposedly on a case-by-case basis) rather than an established rule. The Anti-Semitism Awareness Act would have changed this by making the Working Definition the official definition of antisemitism for Title VI complaints. Now the Executive Order will accomplish this goal since the Anti-Semitism Awareness Act has repeatedly failed to pass in Congress.

Some writers have expressed doubts that the executive order will change anything.75 But this view dissipates once one places the executive order in the context of Marcus’s fifteen-year project of developing Title VI as a tool against pro-Palestinian activism. The use of the working definition—which ropes pro-Palestine and anti-Occupation views into its umbrella—is designed to allow the delegitimization of these views as antisemitic. From the context of Marcus’s history in the federal government and the Brandeis Center, and based on his personal writings, this goal is clear. The abuses that will follow are equally obvious, because they are no more than what Marcus and his political allies have admitted to trying to do. But now, the main barrier to OCR enforcement — excepting a First Amendment challenge — has been removed.


A couple of weeks ago, Kenneth Stern wrote an article in The Guardian, reiterating many of his previous concerns.76 He notes that he is personally a Zionist but supports anti-Zionist students’ right to free expression. After summarizing the history of using the definition in Title VI cases, he writes that he is most concerned about the chilling effect that the Executive Order will have 77:

“The real purpose of the executive order isn’t to tip the scales in a few title VI cases, but rather the chilling effect. ZOA and other groups will hunt political speech with which they disagree, and threaten to bring legal cases. I’m worried administrators will now have a strong motivation to suppress, or at least condemn, political speech for fear of litigation. I’m worried that faculty, who can just as easily teach about Jewish life in 19th-century Poland or about modern Israel, will probably choose the former as safer. I’m worried that pro-Israel Jewish students and groups, who rightly complain when an occasional pro-Israel speaker is heckled, will get the reputation for using instruments of state to suppress their political opponents.

Should we listen to the journalists who claim that not much will change? Or should we trust the two Kenneths, who know the inner workings of the relevant federal bureaucracies from firsthand experience? Marcus, the main architect of this policy, openly admits that a chilling effect is the goal.78 And Stern’s opposition to the Executive Order should give us all pause: if even the designer of this definition of antisemitism disagrees with its use here, something has gone terribly wrong. 

(Note: since we began work on this piece, the right-wing pro-Israel Lawfare Project filed the first Title VI complaint after the Executive Order, against Columbia University.79)

Caroline Morganti lives and works in New York City. Follow her on Twitter (@ctmorganti) and read her (occasionally updated) blog (The Zooming Etrog).

Isaac Brooks Fishman is an attorney. He lives and works in Washington, D.C. 

NCSY discusses Jewish identity, Zionism, & a binational state after the Six-Day War

Highlights from a 1968 NCSY Guide to Israel -- an unapologetically Religious Zionist text that also promotes intellectual engagement with ideological opponents -- with editing contributions from Meir Kahane

While in my shul’s library over Shavuot,1 I found a paper booklet published in June 19682 by the National Council of Synagogue Youth (NCSY), the primary Modern Orthodox youth group. Titled Israel: Eretz Israel, Land of Promise, it provides a fascinating picture of how American Modern Orthodox Jews saw the State of Israel in the wake of the Six-Day War. 

The booklet — which had a price of $1.50 — is about 110 pages and an absolute treasure trove of historical and sociological information. Selecting which parts to quote here was very difficult. (I would upload the booklet in its entirety, but I don’t see a way I could do so without violating copyright. If you would like a pdf for personal or research use — feel free to contact me.) 

Here are cover, title pages, and table of contents:

  • The cover of Israel: Eretz Israel, Land of Promise

Table of Contents

As one can see from the Table of Contents, the book is filled with articles on a variety of topics. What is less apparent is the diversity of format — there are essays on religious ideals as they relate to Zionism and Jewish identity, accounts of the Six Day War, and halakhic issues of ascending the Temple Mount. There’s also a fictional discussion between a young NCSYer visiting his “Uncle Shmuel” in Israel for the first time and a panel discussion of NCSYers discussing responses to the 1967 war (“Jewishness in Israel.”)

And the last section of the book is the most fascinating: titled “Food for Thought — Topics for Discussion — Plans for Action,” there are a series of contemporaneous topics for discussion and activity. 


The preface, from Rabbi Pinchas Stolper,3 explains that the manuscript of the book was originally written by Michael Rosenak,4 “a resident of Jerusalem, who was active for many years in American Jewish youth movements.” Stolper continues:

Mike [Rosenak] is a prominent educator and author who is on the faculty of the Machon Lemadrichei Chutz La’aretz5 in Jerusalem. Despite the fact that I discussed changes in the manuscript with Mike, I have subsequently taken liberties with the text without consulting him; I therefore assume all responsibility for the final form of this text. In the second edition, further editions and changes were made by Rabbi Meir Kahane and Yaakov Kornreich. [emphasis mine]

I’m not anywhere close to well-versed in Kahane’s writings, but given that this was published in the same year that he founded the JDL (1968), I’m not sure how far right he was holding on questions of Zionism at the time. If there’s any writing in this book that shows obvious signs of his ideology, I’m not learned enough to recognize it. Still, Kahane’s name definitely jumps out of the page as an interesting historical quirk.

Here are some highlights from the rest of the booklet.

The Land of Israel as a Conditional Gift

Near the beginning there are lots of sections explaining religious concepts as they relate to modern Zionism. This one, “Eretz Israel — A Conditional Gift” (p. 19), stood out to me. Putting behavioral conditions on Jewish presence/control of Eretz Yisrael — an idea with plenty of rabbinic sources and even explicit verses in the Torah6 — seems less emphasized in Religious Zionist circles these days:    

When the [Jewish] people went into exile, they realized the meaning of the Torah’s promise that their sins would result in the destruction of their country. Then they realized that the Land of Israel is a workshop, a laboratory given by the Lord to a people previously called into existence for the purpose of using the land to carry out G-d’s mitzvot.

Thus, as it developed, the difference between Jewish attachment to the Land of Israel and other nationalisms is that the country of the Jewish people is a conditional gift, bestowed only on those who will use it in the service of the Creator and for the establishment of a righteous Torah society. The homeland is truly a Land of Promise. It is given to the Jewish people in return for their promise to do His will by observing the Torah. [emphasis in original]

Panel discussion among NCSYers 

In a section titled “Jewish Youth Discuss: Our Challenges After The Six-Day War” (p. 69), six NCSYers take part in a panel discussion moderated by Michael Rosenak in Jerusalem. Participating are Alan Bricker (South Africa), Marvin Cohen (United States), David Reinhertz (Israel), Solomon Lieberman (Sweden), Yitzchak Tepper (Uruguay), and Hedy Matyas (Sweden — and the only female representation on the panel). 

Rosenak opens with a question asking the panelists’ first impressions after the Six-Day War:

…Now, five months after the war, which are your conclusions? What do the events we have experienced ‘say’ to you? How do you think they have affected the Jewish people? What are the primary tasks that they have thrust upon us? 

Below are some excerpted answers, which describe a variety of reactions in Israel and the Jewish diaspora.

David Reinhertz (Israel):

“…I think today, Israeli youth has more confidence in itself. For the Jewish people as a whole, the whole war has proved again that our national and religious identity are one and the same.”

Solomon Lieberman (Sweden):

“…It is only since my arrival in Israel this fall that I have come to understand the true miracle of this victory. I have seen the superior Arab battle positions with my own eyes and I have heard first-hand accounts by soldiers of miraculous happenings. As a result of these happenings, Jews in Israel, even those who were formerly anti-religious, seem more favorably inclined toward religious attitudes. But this change is likely to be a temporary one, and we must take advantage of this transient change in attitude before it passes. This is the time to foster Jewish feelings, both national and religious, in the Diaspora and in Israel…”

Hedy Matyas (Sweden):

“The Jews in Sweden…don’t make the impression that they have been very shaken by the victory of Israel. In fact, they’ve already returned to their routine and petty worries.” 

On the newly occupied territories

Rosenak later asks a question about the newly captured territories in the Six-Day War (the West Bank, Gaza, Golan Heights, and Sinai Peninsula):

…What should be our attitude towards settling the “occupied” territories? Yitzchak has suggested that we should be the first to settle the territories. Do you agree that this is the leadership that religious Jewry should give, or do you think that for religious Jews there are other values of Judaism that have priority (e.g. the image of the Jew in the world, the possibility of gaining peace by compromise, etc.)?  

Yitzchak (Uruguay) reiterates his position, saying that there “is no question in my mind that we have the right to keep the new territories.” He cites the halakhic opinion of Sephardic Chief Rabbi Yitzhak Nissim, and claims that the real issue is finding new immigrants to populate the territories. He also dismisses concerns about the Arabs (“they have demanded total annihilation of ‘the intruder’ for the past twenty years. Now they request the return of their territories”) or world opinion (“we know that it is pliable” and regardless, it would have been useless if Israel had actually faced defeat in the war.)  

Marvin, the American panelist, expresses a pragmatic view in line with demographics. Of all the participants who answered this question, he is the only one who suggests land for peace:

Let me express a dissenting view. For me, the most important thing about this state is that it is a Jewish state, in terms of ideals and population both. If we retain the territories, we shall become a minority in our own country in a very short time. Thus our short-range prospects are for a cultural conflict between a Jewish minority engulfed by an Arab majority. And, in the long run, I fear that we shall see here the emergence of an “Israeli” rather than a Jewish society and culture. We may, you say, have gained the world and lost our souls. 

Alan (South Africa) disagrees with Marvin, saying that retaining the territories is “an economic and military necessity,” and specifically notes that returning the Golan Heights to Syria would be dangerous given how the Syrians used the Golan Heights militarily. Regarding settling the occupied territories:

“I look upon settlement of these areas as a mitzvah. The problem of justifying these measures is not really the problem. All fait accomplis justify themselves.”

David (Israel) stresses that keeping the territories will help in attracting olim and projecting a more powerful image internationally, attracting “real friendship” because “we [Israel] are a desirable ally.”  On the Arab population:

“Clearly we must be moral in our dealings with the Arab population, but that doesn’t mean we need neglect our own interests in dealing with them. Our interests too, as well as those of the Arabs, have moral weight.”

The American representative, Marvin, continues to explain his disagreements:

I think we are letting ourselves be carried away here. Just how “powerful” is this “Greater Israel” going to be, that everyone will clamor for its friendship? As powerful as the United States? As the Soviet Union? Frankly, I don’t think that countries will ever align themselves with Israel because of its power but because of its image, what it represents. And so it would be self-defeating for our national goals, as Jews, to maintain any but a “beyond censure” policy towards the Arabs.  

The rest of the discussion primarily focuses on methods for keeping immigrants in Israel, given the difficult adjustments many new immigrants have when moving to a still-developing country.

Discussion questions

The final section of the book has a large number of discussion prompts about issues of the day, ranging from issues of Jewish identity (concepts of chosenness, Jewish identity in exile), to Zionism (going on aliyah), to political issues in Israel (religion and state, Israeli international relations, new immigrant populations.)

Russian Jewish immigration to Israel?

On p. 96, there is a discussion prompt regarding the idea of Russian Jews (not described in the most respectful terms) settling the occupied territories:

It has been suggested that the problems of Russian Jewry and settlement of Israel’s newly conquered territories might both be solved if Russia’s Jews were allowed to come to Israel. What would be the impact of three million assimilated Jews in name only be on Israeli culture and society? 


Being Jewish in America vs. Israel

In the section “Can a Jew Really Be at Home in America?” (p. 90), the reader is asked if it is possible to feel “at home” in American society, even if they live in a religious Jewish neighborhood. But the reader is also asked to think of reasons why it might be more difficult to be a religious Jew in Israel. Example reasons include:

In Israel, there is no need to practice Torah Judaism in order to identify yourself as a Jew. Everyone is Jewish and your very citizenship identifies you.

(“Everyone is Jewish” and equating Jewishness with Israeli citizenship is ironic given the discussion of the Arab minority below — but of course plenty of people still do that in casual conversation today.)

And similarly:

If you are a Sabbath observing father in America and your son asks you why others are driving their cars, you can answer: “We are Jews.” What will the father tell his son in Israel?

Also in this section are questions which are still seen as fundamental today:

Is Israel a democracy or a Jewish state? Is there a difference? 

How are we to decide how Jewish Israel is to be?

Engaging with non-/anti-Zionist arguments

The education guide, while being avowedly Zionist, does not shy away from encouraging debate about non- and anti-Zionist ideas, at least to understand and defeat them.   

In the section “The Jews in Exile,” after discussion questions about why Russian Jews might have supported socialism (one suggestion was a subconscious Messianic yearning), a new proposed activity (p. 84):

CONDUCT A TRIAL of the Jew who insists we are a nation. Among the witnesses for the prosecution:

  1. The American Council for Judaism7
  2. The Internationalist Jew8
  3. The Egyptian delegate to the U.N.9

Another activity (p. 99) suggests not merely a student-led mock trial/debate, but actually inviting speakers to from Neturei Karta (religious anti-Zionist group) and Mizrachi (religious Zionist group):

INVITE a member of Neturai Karta (extreme Orthodox Jews in Jerusalem who do not ‘recognize’ the State of Israel) to discuss his stand with a member of the Mizrachi. Who is more consistent? Who is right?

Proposed engagement with anti-Zionist arguments — especially engaging directly with advocates of such positions — is out of the question in most American Jewish communities today. But the authors of Israel: Land of Promise seem confident that the NCSYers’ Zionist convictions are strong enough to withstand anti-Zionist critique (and indeed might be strengthened by it.)

It might be instructive to imagine which individuals and groups are similar in ideology today, and compare/contrast how they are treated by Jewish institutions. I hesitate to compare the Neturei Karta of today to those of 1968, since some members of Neturei Karta have more recently attended conferences alongside Holocaust deniers.10 But there are still, for example, Satmar Jews who espouse a religious anti-Zionism.

And today’s analogue of the Egyptian U.N. delegate could be, roughly speaking, a BDS activist leader who sees Israel as an illegitimate colonial entity. 

Finally, another section asks readers to examine the reactions of the Old Yishuv to newer Zionist settlement (p. 98):

READ the chapter on the settlement of Petach Tikva in Aliyah: the Peoples of Israel by Howard Sachar. (Why was the ‘old Yishuv’ in Jerusalem opposed to the idea of settlement?)

Discussing a binational state after the 1967 War 

In “Political and Moral Problems of the State of Israel,” there is a section on “The Arab Problem,” which reads as follows:  

Until the Six Day War, the Arab minority in Israel had been granted full political rights, including the right to vote and form their own political parties. In view of the large number of Arabs in the newly conquered territories, and their hostility, should they be granted the same political rights? In the early days of Zionism, the possibility of a bi-national state (Arab and Jewish) of Israel was raised and rejected. Would such a state be workable today?

Leaving aside the historical issues in the framing of the question,11 it is still quite striking to read this today, when suggesting a binational state is completely out of bounds in any mainstream Jewish institution (and generally equated with “denying Israel’s right to exist” or even “destroying Israel.”) Tracing how and when the boundaries of acceptable discourse changed is an endless source of fascination for me. 

Militarism in Israel

The following section, “Is Israel Too Militaristic,” asks teens to debate the practice of military parades on Israel’s Independence Day, a practice later discontinued in Israel due to financial concerns.12 It also asks about what seems like a forerunner to today’s Jerusalem Day flag parade:

What about a parade in the liberated sections of Jerusalem. [sic] Was it a political necessity, or just rubbing salt into Arab wounds?

At the time of publication (June 1968), parading through the Muslim Quarter could not have been characterized as an annual tradition. But today, the annual Yom Yerushalayim flag march has widespread participation among Religious Zionist youth every year, including American gap year students.13 While surely there are those who avoid participating, there seems to be little Religious Zionist opposition. 14


The ways in which the text both paralleled and deviated from contemporary conversation/education about Israel in American Jewish communities is fascinating. 

Some questions are still seen as relevant: how can a state be both Jewish and democraticWhat is the role of Judaism in the public sphere? How does Jewish life look different in the United States vs. Israel?

But some questions are no longer up for debate. A binational state is considered anti-Zionist, if not antisemitic, by mainstream American Jewish leaders. Directly engaging with anti-Zionists, even as people with whom to disagree, is similarly out of the question. And in Modern/Centrist Orthodox circles, where NCSY still operates, land for peace is seen as nothing more than a hypothetical proposal at this point. (Actively promoting a two-state solution and opposing settlement construction that conflicts with that goal is not a normative political stance.)

By cherry-picking certain examples, I don’t want to misconstrue the text — the worldview is very much in line with religiously motivated Zionism, specifically one that embraces a post-’67 messianism. 

But positions on certain questions that are dogma, or nearly so, in Religious Zionist circles today were as yet unresolved at the time this guide was published. And because not very much time had passed since Israel’s founding, the wider range of acceptable discourse on Zionism that characterized the pre-state/pre-WWII period can still be seen, in such a way that often appears progressive by today’s standards.

In the last several years I’ve watched (as an outside observer not professionally involved) the rollout of newer, more progressive Israel education curricula. And there are some genuine innovations, such as including events like the Nakba and deeper attention to Palestinian/Arab citizens of Israel. Certainly, Israel: Land of Promise doesn’t address such issues (it mentions “Arab refugees” once in passing) — though historical scholarship on the matter was stalled while Israeli archives remained sealed. 

But the idea that a more open discussion about Israel — including engagement with certain ideas that are are non-/anti-Zionist, or at least don’t support a “Jewish state” — is a radical departure from the past isn’t accurate. It’s certainly a departure from the past few decades, but examples like this (which are more common before 1967, and even more so before 1948) show that Jewish communal leaders placed value on conversation among Zionists who supported a Jewish nation-state, Zionists who supported something else that they still saw as fulfilling Jewish self-determination, and those who were non- or anti-Zionist.

Today, discussion of a binational state and inviting anti-Zionist Jews to speak does not happen in most American Jewish communities, sometimes as a matter of written policy.15 In some respects, the NCSYers of 1968 could have — with approval of their adult leaders — a more open discussion about Israel in their own Jewish community than most of today’s Hillel students could in theirs. 

And this wasn’t a publication written by the teenagers themselves! The only content from them was the symposium. This was what adults thought would be educationally valuable.

Every individual or institution who suggests — implicitly or explicitly — that non-/anti-Zionism and/or positions conflated with it (like supporting a binational state) are fundamentally objectionable should be pushed to explain, in light of the history of such voices being part of the larger conversation, why those ideas are fundamentally objectionable today. 

Because it matters that there were Zionist leaders who didn’t support a Jewish nation-state.16 And it matters that, even in 1968, NCSY thought some of these ideas were worth discussing.  What circumstances changed? If a two-state agreement now looks unworkable, why is it a grave offense to draw inspiration from pre-’48 sources in imagining an alternative? 

Not knowing the full breadth of ideological diversity that existed within the yishuv and Diaspora Jewish communities causes many people to assume that the current range of acceptable positions hasn’t changed. But it has, and recognizing that makes today’s discursive boundaries look a lot less tenable. Instead of arguing against such boundaries on the purely ideological basis of open discussion/debate, by pointing to historical precedents, one gains practical examples that can be useful in convincing others. How can an idea be inherently objectionable if it’s part of the mesorah?!

And by analogy — we don’t consider someone learned in halakha if they only read the Kitzur Shulchan Aruch. Ideally, they should read the relevant Gemara, Tosafot, Acharonim, etc. to see different approaches and minority opinions, why some were accepted and others rejected, and by whom. For some reason, it seems we don’t do this when teaching about Israel, especially when it comes to possible political arrangements for the Jews and Palestinians who live there. (And it goes without saying, that this is not even considering Palestinian voices, which should absolutely be studied as well.)    

There’s so much in here that I didn’t cover — I got insights from every article, and there are lots of excellent quotes that are too long to type here. But this is a small taste of what’s inside. If you have any specific questions about the contents or want to put in a request for a pdf, feel free to shoot me an email

Brief historical notes on “red lines” in intra-communal Israel discourse

Yousef Munayyer’s latest piece linked to a report titled “The Assault on Israel’s Legitimacy: The Frustrating 20X Question: Why Is It Still Growing? Condition, Direction and Response”1 by the ADL and the Reut Group, an Israeli think-tank.2 Some quick research shows that the paper seems to have been originally leaked3 to pro-Palestinian website The Electronic Intifada almost two years ago, despite now being hosted on the website of the Jewish Council for Public Affairs.

The authors explain the “20X Question” in the title of their report as follows:

The focus of this report is the ‘20X question:’ How can it be that the collective investment of the Jewish community in dealing with this challenge is estimated to be twenty-fold bigger over the past six years, yet results remain elusive? [emphasis mine]

I’m still working my way through the paper, though it is easily digestible in its numerical/bulleted list format. (There are 113 listed points.)

For now, I’ll make some quick comments about a section that jumped out at me:

92. However, even a broad tent has limits, and therefore establishing red lines with regards to the discourse on Israel is also essential:

This caught my attention because “broad tent” and “red lines” are terms that originated with Reut, according to a 2011 policy paper4 on their old website. I first learned about this paper several years ago as a student activist with the Open Hillel campaign, which advocates against Hillel International’s Guidelines for Campus Israel Activities, specifically the Standards of Partnership (which, as noted in the 2011 paper, were developed in consultation with Reut.)5 The basic idea is that the Jewish community should allow for a “broad tent” of Israel supporters within the communal conversation, but actively work to exclude Israel’s “delegitimizers” from the same:

[T]he broad tent approach must be compounded by complementary principles such as:
* Narrowing the definition of ‘delegitimization’ (Reut suggested delegitimization to mean the rejection of the right of the Jewish people to self-determination or of the State of Israel to exist), and then
aggressively outing, naming and shaming delegitimizers [emphasis mine]

(Fun fact: in the paper, Reut mentions that the original framing was “open tent” before it was “broad tent.” Can’t have an open tent now, can we?!6 7 🙂 )

So the section on “red lines” in this new paper is an ideological continuation of Reut’s previous work. Given that almost six years had passed between the publication of these two papers, I wanted to see if there was an evolution in strategy.

I continued to scan and saw the bold-faced intros to each bullet: “On the left…” and “On the right…” Coincidentally, I was recently speaking with the Hillel director of my alma mater (who certainly did not agree with my activism as a student!), who mentioned to me that she and other Hillel directors have been brainstorming proposals for “red lines” for individuals and organizations on the Right to mirror the current Hillel policies, which exclusively affect those on the Left.8

So when I saw these bullet points, I was intrigued. Perhaps this is evidence of (finally) some symmetry, even if I think it’s ill-advised and counterproductive on the Right as well as the Left? The section on the Left is about what you would expect:

On the left, the red lines need to distinguish between legitimate criticism and acts of delegitimization. Such a slippage can occur when criticism is consistently and repeatedly one-sided, not nuanced and without context, for example, when placing all the blame for the current state of the political process with the Palestinians on Israel. This is particularly sensitive since such criticism can quickly feed into the delegitimization campaign;

So I was ready to hear Reut’s idea of what constituted “out of bounds” discourse on the Right.

On the right, the red lines also need to distinguish between legitimate criticism of Israel and delegitimization. In this case, when legitimate criticism is framed as an act of delegitimization and its conveyers as delegitimizers, the pro-Israel community is fragmented and drawn into infighting. In fact, liberal Zionist Jewish organizations are the most effective tools against delegitimization among liberal progressive circles. Moreover, efforts to combat delegitimization will fail if they are accompanied by anti-Muslim sentiments that push soft critics and bystanders toward the delegitimization movement”

…but it turns out it’s not red lines for the Right, but rather, what right-wingers need to keep in mind when those to their left criticize Israel! (Also, LOL @ “don’t be Islamophobes, guys!”)

This is unsurprising, not only because Reut wrote this report under the guidance of the Israeli Strategic Affairs Ministry, but because it would be impossible to write an ideological litmus test for the Right that didn’t exclude significant number of high-ranking Israeli politicians.

Of course, red lines existed far before Reut created this strategy. During my organizing in undergrad, I remember talking to an older woman who remembered when support for the two-state solution was what got one kicked out of the tent. (She mentioned Hillel directors fearing for their job over the matter.)

But communal discourse shifts and we have more access to information and dissenting voices than any time in history. Mainstream Jewish institutions can pour resources toward hasbara as much as they want, but they can’t pay anyone not to listen to ideas outside of their ideological lines. “Outing, naming, and shaming” the (disproportionately young, female, and non-White) Jews who espouse dissenting views only delegitimizes the communal institutions themselves.